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**INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND
ARMY RESERVE INTO THE ARMY ACQUISITION
CORPS: THE NEXT STEP**

BY

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THE NEXT STEP

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ABSTRACT

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The transition to Army XXI and then to Army After Next poses significant challenges for the Total Army. These challenges must be overcome in an environment replete with many diverse opinions concerning the role and composition of the Total Army. Serious internal strife is commonplace as each of the components grasp for a niche in the final equation. True unity comes only with a vastly improved relationship among the components and with an interdependence that comes through teamwork. Today the wisdom of exploiting the total force concept goes beyond the conditions that created it. The active component and the reserve forces of the Army are literally fighting for their lives in the fiscal battles in Washington. It makes sense to pool the political influence of each component as the Army attempts to get resources more closely aligned with its workload. It also makes sense to capitalize on the wide array of talent existing in the Total Army. An area where the Army components can achieve the intent of the Total Force is acquisition.

This paper will review a previous study on the integration of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve into the Army Acquisition Workforce and provide information concerning the present status of this integration. It is only through a continuing effort toward integration that the Total Army can leverage capabilities to contribute to increased military preparedness and a seamless Total Force.

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INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE INTO THE ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS:

THE NEXT STEP

Change alone is unchanging.

— Heraclitus

I. INTRODUCTION

Today, the United States Army is bombarded with change! In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the end of the Cold War, a struggle that had been the backdrop to U.S. military preparedness for over forty years. The Cold War had contributed a frightening but predictable focus to the entire fabric of the Army's existence. Without that focus today, the Army struggles with its own identification.

In a recent article, General Reimer, the Chief of Staff of the Army, reported the Army has shrunk by over 600,000 personnel in the last eight years and closed over 700 bases worldwide. This includes all three components, the active component, the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve.¹ At the same time, however, the Army is being called upon more than ever! Since the end of the Cold War the military has been used twenty-eight times for worldwide missions compared with ten times during the entirety of the Cold War. The Army has endured 60 percent of these missions while receiving approximately 25 percent of DOD resources.² Ironically, with the U.S. now the

lone superpower in the world, it appears the cessation of the Cold War has removed constraints on the use of U.S. military power for other than protecting vital national interests.³

General Reimer insists the cultural changes facing the Army are as momentous as the physical changes. Without the Cold War, there is a need to re-define the entire culture of military affairs.⁴ New threats make the world a much less predictable place and increase the frightening nature of the Army's business. Today's Army must be ready for a multitude of contingencies, some familiar, some new.

The transition to Army XXI and then to Army After Next poses significant challenges for the Total Army. These challenges must be overcome in an increasingly resource constrained environment replete with many diverse opinions concerning the role and composition of the Total Army. Serious internal strife is commonplace as each of the components grasp for a niche in the final equation.

The final report of the National Defense Panel (NDP) emphasized one certainty "... the greatest danger lies in an unwillingness or an inability to change our security posture in time to meet the challenges of the next century."⁵ The report called for a fully integrated "total" force with a common culture that engenders unity of thought and action.⁶ Although Webster's Dictionary defines integration in many ways, the

psychological definition, "... the organization of various traits, feelings, attitudes, etc., into one harmonious personality,"⁷ seems most compelling to this author and best incorporates the "common culture" theme. True unity comes only with a vastly improved relationship among the components and with an interdependence that comes through teamwork.

As the Vietnam War ended it was apparent that a failure to use the National Guard and Army Reserve had resulted in a less committed American public toward the war effort. On August 21, 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird issued the "Total Force Policy." The intent of this policy was to increase the interdependence of the active and reserve forces.⁸

Having lived through the problems of not using the reserves in Vietnam, the Chief of Staff of the Army (1972-74), General Creighton Abrams, was insistent that a future president would not be able to go to war without the National Guard and Army Reserve. In order to accomplish this, General Abrams created "a revised force structure that integrated reserve and active elements so closely as to make the reserves virtually inextricable from the whole."⁹

Today, the wisdom of exploiting the total force concept goes beyond the conditions that created it. The active component and the reserve forces of the Army are literally fighting for their lives in the fiscal battles in Washington.

It makes sense to pool the political influence of each component as the Army attempts to get resources more closely aligned with its workload. It also makes sense to capitalize on the wide array of talent and capability existing in the Total Army.

In a September 1997 news release, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced the implementation of a new policy memorandum emphasizing increased reliance on the reserve forces. Secretary Cohen stated:

This memorandum is significant because it sets the tone for how we must work as a Total Force as we move into the 21st century. It recognizes that in the post-Cold War world, we are having to rely on our Reserves more and more. During the Cold War, our objective was easier to state - deter an attack by Soviet Forces, and prevent a nuclear holocaust. Today's problems are more complex and our Total Force must be seamless. We cannot achieve this as separate Active and Reserve components.¹⁰

An area where the Army components can achieve the intent of the Total Force is acquisition. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) was enacted on November 5, 1990. The legislation was passed as a response to criticism of the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition system and sought to professionalize the DOD acquisition workforce through the establishment of education, training, and experience requirements.

Although DAWIA does not specifically mention the reserve components, it is logical to assume Congress did not intend them to be excluded from the provisions of the act. After all, the

act sought to improve the acquisition workforce throughout DOD.

Two of the implementing regulations of the act, namely DODD 5000.52 (Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development Program) and DODI 5000.58 (Defense Acquisition Workforce) do specifically include the reserve components in their applicability statement.

This paper will review a previous study of the integration of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve into the Army Acquisition Workforce and provide information concerning the present status of this integration. It is only by a continued effort toward integration and teamwork that the Total Army can leverage capabilities to contribute to increased military preparedness and a seamless Total Force. This paper will argue that a complete integration of the reserve components into the Army Acquisition Corps will help bring about the cultural changes called for by the Army leadership.

II. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Colonel Austin R Omlie, United States Army and Lieutenant Colonel (P) Terry R Council, Oklahoma Army National Guard completed a Senior Service College Fellowship at the University of Texas as members of the Class of 1997. As part of the fellowship, they completed a research project entitled, "Requirements Assessment and Integration of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard into the Army Acquisition Corps."¹¹ In the paper, Omlie and Council provided a detailed review of the background to acquisition reform and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA).¹² In addition, they offered a comprehensive overview of each of the reserve components and the Army Acquisition Corps. The paper concluded with a report on the integration efforts up to that point and a suggestion of potential reserve component acquisition pilot programs.

Overall, Omlie and Council described the integration as an initiative benefiting the Total Army. In the end, they concluded the integration of the reserve components into the Army Acquisition Workforce (AAW) was underway but many challenges still existed.¹³ Specifically, the authors were concerned with the process being used to effect the integration, potential management problems existing during and beyond

integration, and the identification and certification of Reserve Component AAW (RC AAW) personnel.

The following is a summary of this author's interpretation of the major concerns elucidated in the Omlie/Council paper. This material provides a valid point of departure to discuss the current situation.

Process. In October 1996, the Director of the Army Acquisition Corps, LTG Ronald V. Hite, established a Process Action Team (PAT) to review and provide recommendations for the establishment, integration, training, management and utilization of RC AAW members. Additionally, the PAT was to ensure the RC members met the certification, training and experience requirements of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). Membership for the PAT was to include representatives from all affected organizations. As of the date of the Omlie/Council paper, the PAT had met twice.

Omlie and Council suggested the PAT was losing efficiency due to the turnover of key PAT members. In addition, they pointed out that because the PAT members all serve in an additional duty status they were finding it hard to find time to devote to PAT duties.¹⁴

Management of RC AAW. Omlie and Council expressed concerns about the management structure of the RC AAW. They supported the appointment of an acquisition qualified RC general officer

to work in the office of the Director of Acquisition Career Management (DACM). This officer would serve as an "Assistant DACM" and provide advocacy to reserve component acquisition personnel and programs. At the time of the completion of their research project, Omlie and Council reported the USAR had indeed forwarded a candidate for approval.¹⁵

Omlie and Council suggested the appointment of senior officers within the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) and the Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG) to serve exclusively as the respective component's primary patron for day-to-day acquisition matters. These officers would report directly to the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) and the Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG), respectively.¹⁶

In addition, the authors noted the Army Reserve had appointed an Acquisition Functional Area Personnel Management Officer (PMO) at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). This officer is responsible for the oversight of USAR acquisition personnel assignments. The Army National Guard had assigned personnel oversight responsibility for contracting positions to the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (NGB-PARC). It seems apparent that Omlie and Council were concerned about other areas of acquisition in that they recommended the ARNG appoint an individual similar to the USAR's PMO with responsibility for all acquisition personnel matters.¹⁷

Finally, the authors pointed out the unique nature of the reserve components, which makes the development of an effective database for acquisition personnel management imperative.¹⁸

Identification. In February of 1997, the first Reserve Acquisition Position List (RAPL) validation board was held in conjunction with the Military Acquisition Position List (MAPL) validation board. The board, comprised of active and reserve members, reviewed approximately fifty Army Reserve positions and validated forty-three for the FY98 RAPL. Data in the Omlie/Council paper did not reflect any Army National Guard positions among the forty-three.

Omlie and Council pointed out the majority of the positions included in the FY98 RAPL were in Functional Area 97 (FA97) - Contracting/Industrial Management and there were no equipment acquisition program management positions submitted for validation. The low number of positions submitted for validation also concerned them. Previous estimates projected many more acquisition positions in both the USAR and the ARNG.¹⁹

Certification. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) establishes basic qualification criteria for certification of acquisition personnel. The criteria entail relatively clear experience, education and training components. Omlie and Council expressed several concerns with the procedures

to be used by the reserve components in certifying acquisition personnel.²⁰

In accordance with DAWIA, only those personnel whose positions are certified on the RAPL are eligible to receive centrally funded training at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). Poor identification of the RCAAW will jeopardize the training of those personnel not identified.

The amount and source of resources necessary for training RCAAW personnel was another concern. For Full-time Support (FTS) personnel, funding concerns do not exist other than the individual's absence from normal duties while attending training. These personnel may attend training in their AGR or technician status and the DAU will pay the temporary duty (TDY) costs associated with the training as long as they are on the RAPL.²¹ The DAU cannot compensate RC soldiers for pay and allowances associated with training.

Omlie and Council believe the potential difficulty thought to face the RCAAW in obtaining Level III certification is overstated. The authors maintained there would be very few non-FTS RC officers who would need level III certification.²²

Concerning certification authority for RC acquisition personnel, the authors propose a system similar to that used by the AC. They recommend the recently established Acquisition PMO at ARPERCEN be delegated authority to approve level I and II

USAR certifications. For the ARNG, they would place the authority with the position they recommended as a counterpart to the ARPERCEN PMO. Level III certification would be approved by the DACM.²³

Present Reserve Acquisition Initiatives. As identified by the Omlie/Council paper, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard are presently involved in Army acquisition initiatives. Besides day-to-day contracting activities, the Army Reserve is pursuing methods of modernizing and improving many current items of equipment through a greater interaction with industry. Equipment acquisition programs for the Army Reserve are conducted at the various commodity commands of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Many items of USAR equipment are acquired as standard issue of new equipment and upgrades of older systems. Some USAR equipment is acquired with specifically funded Congressional Appropriations to purchase high priority items that will significantly improve readiness.²⁴

Omlie and Council report participation by the Army National Guard in equipment acquisition programs identical to the USAR. In addition, the Guard is involved in day-to-day contracting actions throughout the fifty-four states and territories and has two distinct developmental acquisition projects - the Reserve Components Automation System (RCAS) and the Distance Learning Initiative.²⁵

In the paper, Omlie and Council discuss the possibilities of implementing pilot acquisition programs in the reserve components that would foster integration without organizational restructuring of the reserve components. Specifically, these programs are as follows:

Acquisition Program Management. Omlie and Council suggest acquisition qualified RC personnel could man the project management offices of AMC which manage equipment acquisition products for the RC.²⁶ RC acquisition professionals could serve as Program/Product Managers (PM's) in any program that supplies equipment for the RC.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNSB) was delegated the responsibility for development of the Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) by Congress in fiscal year 1987. The RCAS Program Management Office (PMO), made up of ARNG, USAR, and Department of the Army civilians, was not required to follow either the DOD 5000 or 8000 series directives for acquisition systems. A Department of the Army Inspector General report indicated the RC needed more acquisition professionals when responsible for acquisition programs.²⁷

The ARNG is also responsible for the program management of another initiative - the Distance Learning Initiative. Omlie and Council recommend this program should be managed by

acquisition professionals to avoid a repeat of the RCAS problems.²⁸

Contingency Contracting. The increased deployments of Army units to participate in contingency operations carry with it an increased requirement for the acquisition of supplies and services to support such deployments. Omlie and Council report the Army Reserve was in the process of establishing a Troop Program Unit (TPU) named "Team LOGCAP" (Logistics Civil Augmentation Program) to support contingency contracting operations for deployed units.²⁹ There was no mention of Army National Guard contingency contracting initiatives in their paper.

Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Acquisition Personnel. For many years, Army Reserve IMA's and IRR's have played a very viable role serving as augmentees to a variety of acquisition related activities. Omlie and Council express concern about the cuts imposed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that may adversely affect the IMA/IRR programs and diminish them as a source for integration initiatives.³⁰

III. CURRENT STATUS OF INTEGRATION INITIATIVES

The status of integration initiatives as they stand today and recommendations for future direction will be covered in sections as follows:

1. Process
2. Management of RC AAW
3. Identification
4. Certification
5. Acquisition Program Management
6. Contingency Contracting
7. IMA/IRR Acquisition Personnel
8. Other Initiatives

1. Process. The Process Action Team (PAT) established in 1996 was successful in identifying issues and initiating integration efforts. With the issues raised to higher leadership levels, it was soon apparent the initiative gained some direction. Since the previous study, individuals within the Acquisition Career Management Office and the reserve components themselves have largely taken over the PAT team responsibilities.³¹

It appears the original PAT charter is too broad at this point and may not provide for continued effectiveness. Many of the initial issues are being resolved and individual Integrated Process Teams (IPT) can be established to deal with specifics that arise henceforth. If the PAT united and gave direction to the personnel responsible for resolving these issues then it should be considered a success.

2. Management of RC AAW. The management of the RC AAW is receiving more attention from both reserve components. The USAR appointed an acquisition qualified Major General as the Assistant Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASARDA). This officer provides advocacy and liaison for the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve within the Army Acquisition Corps.³²

As mentioned before, the Army Reserve has appointed an Acquisition Functional Area Personnel Management Officer (PMO) at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). This officer is responsible for the oversight of USAR acquisition personnel assignments.

The USAR has had a senior officer (O-5) working in the Acquisition Career Management Office (ACMO) over the past year. At this time, that individual has departed and a replacement has not been named.³³ The ARNG has recently assigned a senior officer (O-5) to the same office to serve as the ARNG Proponency Officer. This officer works for the Director, ACMO, and is responsible for liaison with the ARNG and providing input for policy formulation affecting the ARNG. In addition, in concert with ARNG Personnel Directorate (NGB-ARP), this officer will be responsible for ARNG acquisition personnel oversight, which includes accessioning and career management.³⁴

As of yet, the Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG) and the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) have not appointed senior officers within their commands to provide exclusive day-to-day advocacy for the acquisition program as suggested by Omlie and Council. Existing managers within each command are accomplishing these roles along with other duties.³⁵ There seems to be some movement toward appointing an Acquisition Career Management Advocate (ACMA) within each of the reserve components.³⁶

Within National Guard Bureau (NGB), the PARC continues to be responsible for oversight and administration of National Guard contracting functions and is the alter ego of the Head of the Contracting Activity for all delegated responsibilities described in the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation (AFAR) Supplement. The contracting functions include all contracting procedures associated with Federal contracts, cooperative agreements, and Small Business Programs throughout the fifty-four States and territories.³⁷ The PARC is a member of the NGB Joint Staff, and as such, has responsibilities for both Army and Air National Guard contracting programs. At this time, the PARC has level I and II certification authority for contracting (FA97) personnel of the National Guard.

The Assistant Deputy Director of the Army National Guard for Support (NGB-ARZ-S) is responsible for the ARNG acquisition

programs. This includes the equipment procurement programs and support of Army acquisition programs.³⁸

The concerns about a database for management of RC acquisition personnel are being addressed as follows. The USAR is in the process of developing a database at ARPERCEN. This database will be managed by the Acquisition PMO.³⁹ At this time, the PARC at NGB is maintaining a database for ARNG contracting (FA97) personnel. In the future, it appears the database for FA51 and FA53 acquisition personnel will be maintained by NGB-ARP and the ARNG Proponency Officer with the Acquisition Career Management Office (ACMO).⁴⁰

There is some concern within the ARNG United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) community on assignment authority for higher level ARNG acquisition personnel upon integration into the Army Acquisition Corps. It is their opinion this authority must remain where it is at present, with the various Governors, Adjutants General and National Guard Bureau.⁴¹ According to personnel at ACMO, the AAC is fully aware that the States manage these personnel and integration will only affect them in a positive manner by making new opportunities available.⁴²

3. Identification. The identification of Reserve Component acquisition positions has shown a great deal of progress since the first Reserve Acquisition Position List (RAPL) board was

conducted in February 1997. As previously stated in this paper, there were forty-three USAR positions and zero Army National Guard positions validated during that board.

A second RAPL (FY 99) was held the week of 16 March 1998. The board, comprised of active and reserve members, reviewed 171 Army Reserve and 64 Army National Guard positions.⁴³ The results of the board are scheduled to be released in late summer, 1998. The board is being held open in the meantime to allow both reserve components additional time to identify all positions. From an analysis of TDA's and MTOE's, it is estimated there are approximately 372 USAR and 139 ARNG acquisition positions.⁴⁴

There were no RC equipment acquisition program management positions validated on this RAPL. At this time, the RC does not have RC acquisition personnel managing any equipment acquisition programs. As will be discussed later in this paper, the RC is going to compete for Product/Program Manager (PM) positions in the future. Currently, both RC components have liaison officers in place at various Commodity Commands of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and at AMC itself.⁴⁵ In the future, the RC should require that these individuals be acquisition qualified.

4. Certification. The certification of RC AAW personnel has been enhanced by the improvement in identification noted above. Further efforts must be expended, however, to ensure that all RC AAW positions are identified and validated through

the RAPL process. RC AAW personnel, whose positions are not validated on the RAPL, are ineligible for centrally funded acquisition training. The Reserve Components can only benefit from a full identification and can contribute to the Total Force concept by support of AC acquisition programs.

As pointed out in the Omlie/Council paper, resources required for training RC acquisition personnel might be the greatest impediment to inclusion of all RC acquisition personnel. To the extent the RC uses non-FTS personnel for acquisition positions, the problem can be magnified. Funding for pay and allowances necessary to train non-FTS acquisition personnel is in very short supply within the ARNG. In most cases, non-AGR Guard officers must complete training beyond the Basic Officer Course through corresponding studies and USAR schools (using Annual Training and Inactive Duty Training days).

The USAR has requested specific (fenced) funding to train non-FTS acquisition personnel throughout the upcoming Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle. If this funding is approved, the USAR will have solved their problem.⁴⁶

Omlie and Council have asserted the difficulty facing the RC with level III certification is overstated because, in their view, very few non-FTS acquisition personnel will require that level of certification. If this is true, one may also think it unlikely that many traditional reservists would need training

for any level. This is not borne out by the facts, however. On the latest RAPL, the ARNG sent forward 11 AGR positions, 19 Military Technician positions and 34 traditional Guard positions.⁴⁷ The USAR sent forward 31 AGR positions, 115 TPU (traditional reservist) positions and 25 IMA positions. The USAR is aware of approximately 205 IMA positions that were not forwarded and is presently working to correct this matter.⁴⁸ If these numbers are indicative of the RC AAW, it is apparent there are significant numbers of non-FTS acquisition personnel who will require training. Level III certification will be required for a certain percentage of non-FTS acquisition personnel as well. Congress could assist the RC/AC integration efforts considerably by approving the USAR funding request and appropriating funds specifically for pay and allowances of ARNG personnel attending acquisition training at DAU.

Based on the numbers shown above, there may also be a need for more creative approaches to certify experience for traditional RC AAW members. More care needs to be taken when evaluating civilian acquired skills. Recruiting efforts should be directed toward those individuals that perform appropriate acquisition-related duties in government and the private sector.

The certification authority for RC acquisition personnel has not yet been completely finalized.⁴⁹ With integration initiatives gaining more momentum, it is essential this policy

be completed. Assigning USAR certification authority for levels I and II to the Acquisition Functional Area Personnel Management Officer (PMO) at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) should be implemented. For the ARNG, the PARC should be given the level I and II certification authority for the entire ARNG acquisition workforce. Level III certification authority should remain with the DACM.

Some members of the ARNG USPFO community are also concerned by the requirement that an individual must actually be slotted in a RAPL position to be eligible for centrally funded DAU training. This can be an extreme disadvantage during personnel changes. In most cases, the departing employee must have departed before a replacement can be assigned to the "acquisition" position. This requirement makes it difficult for an individual to begin the required training before being assigned to the position.⁵⁰ Due to the small number of qualified contracting personnel assigned to most states, some system of position projection must be implemented within the ARNG. The USAR Acquisition Functional Area Personnel Management Officer (PMO) at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) does approve acquisition personnel projected for a RAPL slot for training at DAU.⁵¹

5. Acquisition Program Management. Some progress has been made in this area over the past year. At this time, there is

potential for four PM positions to be filled by RC officers. One RC candidate was considered by the O-6 PM Board held in January 1998.⁵² This officer competed with AC officers but was not selected as evidenced by the results of the board released on 30 April 1998.⁵³

A General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC), comprised of AC acquisition, USAR and ARNG general officers has identified several O-5 PM positions that could be filled with reserve component acquisition officers.⁵⁴ During the week of 16 March 1998, a separate board was held to select RC PM's. There were twenty-one candidates sent forward for this board (eighteen USAR/three ARNG). Results of the board were released on 14 April 1998. Four officers (three USAR and one ARNG) were selected and will be appointed to PM positions in the near future. Next year, both boards will be held "head-to-head" among all candidates, active and reserve.⁵⁵

6. Contingency Contracting. There is no doubt the Army needs assistance in the area of contingency contracting. Presently, an Integrated Process Team (IPT) has been chartered to draft doctrine, review personnel requirements and recommend organizational structure for contingency contracting operations. The team will be investigating the potential of using reserve acquisition personnel for contingency contracting operations.

The USAR and ARNG are both represented on the IPT, which began conducting meetings in April 1998.⁵⁶

Currently, the USAR may be in a better position to support contingency contracting operations than the ARNG. Team LOGCAP may provide specific force structure to support contingency contracting operations. IMA/IRR soldiers are not bound to Troop Program Unit (TPU) assignments that have specific unit responsibilities.

The ARNG, on the other hand, does not have unique force structure organized exclusively to perform contingency contracting missions. Additionally, the ARNG does not have programs equivalent to IMA or IRR. Any State personnel from the ARNG performing contingency contracting missions would either have to come from a unit MTOE position or a STARC TDA position. Both of these solutions are found wanting because the present workload of these soldiers is already overburdened. Current NGB personnel are also too committed to present duties to offer much relief in contingency contracting operations.

For the ARNG, this comes down to two major concerns - training and mobility. Contingency contracting personnel must be trained in order to mobilize. Once trained, they must be in a position to mobilize as an element without other mission responsibilities. This would indicate a solution for the ARNG similar to Team LOGCAP.

In order to solve the training issue, the Army should provide funds to pay ARNG personnel to work in ARNG Purchasing and Contracting (P&C) divisions in selected United States Property and Fiscal Offices.⁵⁷ Including these positions on the RAPL would make the occupants eligible for centrally funded training through DAU. When not in training, the soldiers can be fulfilling the experience requirements by working in the P&C division.

The ARNG would need to delineate a portion of the TDA structure within the STARC's to provide force structure for these contingency contracting teams. This solution will provide for a "win/win" solution for both the Army and the National Guard.

7. IMA/IRR Acquisition Personnel. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) soldiers are members of the Selected Reserve of the USAR and as such, may be called to active duty by the President in case of an emergency. There are slightly over 8,000 IMAs serving in the USAR today. These soldiers are typically assigned to high-level headquarters where they would serve if mobilized. In most cases, they train for two weeks annually.⁵⁸ The IMA program has been cut from over 14,000 spaces in FY 1989 to its present level of 8,000.⁵⁹ At present, there are approximately 226 IMA personnel involved in acquisition related operations.⁶⁰

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel are fully trained soldiers who have either recently left active duty or have elected to remain active as Army Reservists not in a TPU or as an IMA. There are presently 255,000 members in the IRR.⁶¹ These soldiers may be a source of support for acquisition operations if they had experience while on active duty or as a civilian acquired skill. Identification of potential contributors from the IRR would seem to be the biggest challenge.

The troop unit structure of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve is made up of units with specific MTOE's. This structure is not always conducive to augmentation of Army acquisition operations. IMA and IRR soldiers are much more available for such duty, and as such, should be a major source of support for acquisition integration efforts. Further cutbacks in the IMA program would deal a serious blow to the integration efforts of active and reserve acquisition.

8. Other Initiatives. Currently, there are several other initiatives taking place within the Reserve Components that should fall within the realm of AC/RC acquisition integration.

The Troop Program Unit (TPU) of the Army Reserve has nearly 187,000 soldiers in more than 2,000 units located throughout the United States, Guam, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Germany. Supporting the USAR on a daily basis, approximately 11,300 soldiers serve in the USAR Active Guard Reserve (AGR)

program. Command and Control of the USAR is effected by the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. USARC units are split into ten geographically dispersed Regional Support Commands (RSC). Units outside the continental United States are under the command of the warfighting theater commanders.⁶²

The Army Reserve supports its units with purchasing and contracting activities on a daily basis. To further support acquisition programs, they are currently performing analysis to determine the extent of their acquisition workforce and identifying viable numbers for acquisition career paths. The USAR is also determining which PM positions would be most conducive to USAR operations.⁶³

The Army National Guard, a community based force of 367,000, is the Army's largest MACOM. There are 3,360 armories located in 2,700 communities throughout the nation and in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. This structure is supported by a large number of dedicated federal technicians, Active Guard/Reserve soldiers and federally reimbursed State employees. Purchasing and contracting personnel within each state must meet the appropriate requirements of DAWIA and are qualified to provide services to both the Active Army and the Army Reserve.

The Army National Guard has many ongoing programs that can contribute to the needs of the Total Army. In a memorandum

dated 17 December 1996 (Subject: Army Missions the Army National Guard Can Assume), the Director of the Army National Guard delineated several areas in which the Army National Guard can contribute more to the Total Force concept. Each State has a built-in support activity embodied in the State Area Command (STARC). If the States are thought of as support installations, it is readily apparent a great deal of Infrastructure Support can be provided for more than Army Guard units and the Adjutant General.⁶⁴

The preceding concept is dubbed, "Fort State," and seeks to obtain maximum use of available resources.⁶⁵ A recently completed study has suggested changes within the STARC,⁶⁶ but there are minimum functions and structures that must remain to effectively support the Army National Guard. If these support activities are leveraged properly, they can be used to provide support for the benefit of the Total Army and the other services, as well.

The ARNG has addressed the concerns previously mentioned about the RCAS program by the involvement of acquisition professionals. The RCAS program is successfully providing automation equipment to the RC throughout the nation. The National Guard Distributive Training Technology Program (DTTP) is also well underway and using acquisition professionals.⁶⁷ Congress mandated this program in fiscal year 1995 as a

demonstration program to evaluate the effectiveness of distance learning technologies as a way to reduce readiness costs.⁶⁸

The ARNG is currently a "full partner" with AMC, FORSCOM, TRADOC and the USAR in the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) program. This nationwide program focuses on component repair above the direct support level. ARNG maintenance facilities⁶⁹ that have successfully won a competitive bid are designated as Centers of Excellence (COE), and as such perform repairs on specific components for themselves and numerous regional or national customers. Using best business practices, the ISM program seeks greater efficiency through competition and improved performance measures to generate savings for overtaxed repair budgets. Maintenance capabilities of ARNG activities are enhanced from the experience gained by working on AC components from modern equipment.⁷⁰

The ARNG is also using creative measures to sustain its aging tactical wheeled vehicle fleet and train soldiers. In a 1995 test, the Texas ARNG used Inspect and Repair Only as Necessary (I.R.O.N.) techniques to perform General Support level rebuilds on sixty-eight trucks (five-ton and two and one-half-ton) for an average cost of \$38,000. This represented savings of \$20,000 per truck over the costs of depot-level rebuilds.⁷¹ This program continues to this day and has been expanded to include other types of Army vehicles as well as vehicles of the

United States Marine Corps (USMC).⁷² In all, there have been 166 ARNG trucks, 218 ARNG M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 134 USMC five-ton trucks and 201 USMC M998 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) rebuilt under the program.⁷³

Many of these programs can benefit by having a more professionally trained acquisition workforce within the RC. Problems encountered with Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) program management could be repeated if the RC is not more attuned to the qualifications and professional competence of those personnel engaging in acquisition related projects.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A brief recapitulation of the recommendations made in section III of this paper may be helpful. The recommendations will be organized under the same headings shown in Section III.

1. Process. It appears the initial Process Action Team has been successful. The management structure in place at this time should continue to implement integration initiatives and use Integrated Process Teams (IPT's) to recommend solutions to specific concerns arising in the future.

2. Management of RC AAW. The management structure for RC AAW is nearly complete. The USAR should assign another senior officer to the ACMO as soon as possible to provide liaison between the Reserve and the AAC. The CAR and DARNG should each appoint an Acquisition Career Management Advocate. The database for management of RC acquisition personnel needs to be finalized within each of the reserve components and should be reviewed for adequacy upon completion.

3. Identification. A final effort must be immediately implemented to ensure that all RC acquisition related positions are identified and reported through the RAFL process. Reserve officers working within AMC who are involved with equipment acquisition programs should be acquisition qualified.

4. Certification. Based upon the numbers of non-FTS RC acquisition personnel, some attention must be directed toward

the potential funding shortfall for pay and allowances required for training. Approval of the USAR request would solve the problem for the Army Reserve. A similar initiative should be investigated for the Army National Guard. Additionally, the ARNG needs to review its policies on projecting new members into a RAPL slot to ensure centrally funded training at DAU. Certification authority for both reserve components must be finalized as soon as possible. More research is necessary to review the procedures for evaluating civilian acquired experience.

5. Acquisition Program Management. The competition for PM positions needs to be continued as planned. The reserve components should increase the number of personnel available for such assignments, even at the expense of other programs.

6. Contingency Contracting. The ARNG should explore the feasibility of establishing contingency contracting teams as a portion of various STARC TDA's on a regional basis. The Army should provide funding for the personnel to obtain experience working within the USPFO contracting divisions.

7. IMA/IRR Acquisition Personnel. Actions should be implemented to ensure that further cutbacks in the IMA program do not adversely affect USAR acquisition programs.

8. Other Initiatives. Programs that leverage the use of RC infrastructure throughout the world should be exploited to advance the Total Army concept.

The Army acquisition community and the reserve components can lead the way toward a more seamless total force by pushing forward with integration efforts. The rewards to each component are significant. The reserve components can take advantage of tremendous opportunities to become more relevant and gain more control over reserve equipment acquisition programs. Within the Active Component, there are approximately 2,300 required military acquisition positions. Each year, the Army only authorizes fill for a certain percentage of these positions. By fiscal year 2000, the number authorized will be 2,000. With an estimated eleven percent in Trainees, Transients, Holdees, Students (TTHS) status, that means there will be approximately 1,780 personnel available for 2,300 positions. That leaves over five hundred military positions vacant and the only way the shortfall can be ameliorated is by using qualified reserve personnel, who are certified as acquisition professionals.

V. CONCLUSION

The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) is not the only initiative that seeks to improve the process of acquisition. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) and the National Defense Panel (NDP) all offer insights into potential synergies made possible by a more integrated Army acquisition force.

The QDR, completed in May 1997, investigated major issues facing the military in today's world. The review analyzed the threat and proposed a strategy to face that threat. It also recommended implementation and resourcing components for the strategy.⁷⁴

The NDP completed its analysis and issued a final report in December 1997. The NDP focused on the long-term issues facing this country. Included among these issues are acquisition reform issues and the business processes used by DOD as they pertain to long term strategies.⁷⁵

The DRI, released in November 1997, was intended as a complement to the QDR. It suggested the use of modern practices found in the private sector that can improve DOD business management practices. The authors of the DRI maintained "DOD has labored under support systems and business practices that are at least a generation out of step with modern corporate America."⁷⁶

The DRI offered initiatives in four major areas. First, it proposed DOD **reengineer** by adopting "modern business practices to achieve world-class standards of performance." Second, it suggested **consolidation** which would "streamline organizations to remove redundancy and maximize synergy." Third, it promoted **competition** that would "apply market mechanisms to improve quality, reduce costs, and respond to customer needs." Finally, the DRI proposed to **eliminate** by reducing "excess support structures to free resources and focus on core competencies."⁷⁷

Within each of the initiatives of the DRI there lies immense opportunities to enhance the business of Army Acquisition through integration of the Army active and reserve components; improving relations and achieving the Defense Reform Initiatives at the same time. The Reserve Components are postured to become full partners in acquisition programs, which will contribute to the cultural changes called for by the Army leadership.

This paper concentrates on integration efforts in the acquisition arena. There are undoubtedly many other initiatives possible in other areas. One thing these initiatives all have in common, however, is to provide opportunities for teamwork. As stated before, true unity comes only with a vastly improved relationship among the components and with an interdependence that comes through teamwork.

To perform as a team, the components must improve the level of trust that exists between them. Depending on each other to achieve a common goal is unlikely without an extreme effort on the part of all members of the Total Force. The natural tendency seems to support independent, rather than interdependent actions. By working together and becoming familiar with the unique cultures possessed by each partner, the components can build trust.

Team research emphasizes the need for "significant performance challenges" to energize teams. A sense of mission or an overarching purpose and some sense of urgency seem to be the main ingredient for most successful teams.⁷⁸ The Total Army can take advantage of the present opportunities to excel with acquisition efforts and survive declining budgets to provide that "significant performance challenge."

Another condition necessary for successful team formation is mutual accountability. Commitment and trust are underlying requirements necessary to facilitate mutual accountability. Successful team members acknowledge the existence of ingrained individualism but persist toward team accountability to strengthen interdependence.⁷⁹ Since all components of the Army are dependent upon one another, mutual accountability is a condition that must be improved. Integration of AC/RC acquisition efforts will strengthen mutual accountability.

The primary enemy of any integration effort is mistrust of the unknown. Each component has a long and successful history of achievement. Instead of focusing exclusively on the achievements of the component to which one belongs, the leaders of our Army need to learn about and appreciate the achievements of the other components. The following passage, written by Thomas Hobbes in 1651, gives insight into the reason that it is so difficult to look past one's own ideas and obtain an appreciation for those of another.

For prudence, is but experience; which equal time, equally bestows on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.⁸⁰

Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, in their book, *Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge*, state that the "...future is now and it's our turn."⁸¹ In their discussion of leadership and the need for vision, they state that the vision must grow from the interests of the organization and must be claimed or owned by

all leaders.⁸² Creating synergy in the Total Army will make the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Negative synergy saps an organization of its strength and is akin to "...trying to drive down the road with one foot on the gas and the other foot on the brake!"⁸³ The time has come and the leadership of the various Army components is being summoned to eschew the parochialism of the moment and demonstrate courage and forward thinking that will produce one vision and create synergy throughout the "Total Army!"

ENDNOTES

¹ Dennis J. Reimer, "America's Army: Into the Twenty-First Century," *National Security Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 123.

² Ibid., 124.

³ William T. Johnsen, *Force Planning Considerations for Army XIX*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 18, 1998, v.

⁴ Reimer, "America's Army: Into the Twenty-First Century," 124.

⁵ National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* (Arlington, VA: <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/>, December, 1997), i.

⁶ Ibid., iv.

⁷ *Webster's New World Dictionary* (1982), s.v. "Integration."

⁸ Charles E. Heller, *Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 7, 1994, 2.

⁹ Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," *Parameters* 21, No. 2 (Summer 1991): 43.

¹⁰ Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), *Secretary Cohen Signs Memorandum Emphasizing Increased Reliance on the Reserve Components*, by Lt. Col. Terry Jones, press release, Department of Defense, 472-97 (Washington, D.C., 1997).

¹¹ Austin R. Omlie and Terry R. Council, "Requirements Assessment and Integration of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard into the Army Acquisition Corps" (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 1997).

¹² Ibid., 3.

¹³ Ibid., 78.

¹⁴ Ibid., 59.

¹⁵ Ibid., 60.

¹⁶ Ibid., 66.

¹⁷ Ibid., 67.

¹⁸ Ibid., 68.

¹⁹ Ibid., 61.

²⁰ Ibid., 69.

²¹ Ibid., 71.

²² Ibid., 69.

²³ Ibid., 70.

²⁴ Ibid., 40.

²⁵ Ibid., 51.

²⁶ Ibid., 74.

²⁷ Ibid., 57.

²⁸ Ibid., 56.

²⁹ Ibid., 75.

³⁰ Ibid., 76.

³¹ LTC Adolph Ernst, Office of ASARDA, interview by author, 3 April 1998, telephone.

³² LTC Bob Hammons, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 27 March 1998, telephone.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 8 April 1998, telephone.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone and LTC Dennis Smith, Acquisition PMO, ARPERCEN, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

³⁷ "NGB Joint Offices - Acquisition," National Guard Bureau Homepage, <http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/bureau/ochief/acq.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 April 1998.

³⁸ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

³⁹ LTC Dennis Smith, Acquisition PMO, ARPERCEN, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁴⁰ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁴¹ COL Jerry Hoenke, USPFO for SD, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁴² LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁴³ LTC Bob Hammons, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 27 March 1998, telephone.

⁴⁴ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ LTC Dennis Smith, Acquisition PMO, ARPERCEN, interview by author, 1 May 1998, telephone.

⁴⁷ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁴⁸ LTC Dennis Smith, Acquisition PMO, ARPERCEN, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁴⁹ Karen Walker, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 7 April 1998, telephone.

⁵⁰ COL Jerry Hoenke, USPFO for SD, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁵¹ LTC Dennis Smith, Acquisition PMO, ARPERCEN, interview by author, 1 May 1998, telephone.

⁵² Karen Walker, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 7 April 1998, telephone.

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⁵⁵ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ The funding could be used to pay personnel in either Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) status or as Temporary Military Technicians.

⁵⁸ "Army Reserve - A Federal Force," *United States Army Reserve Homepage*, <http://www.army.mil/usar/fedforce.pdf>; Internet; accessed 26 April 1998.

⁵⁹ Omlie and Council, "Requirements Assessment and Integration of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard into the Army Acquisition Corps," 37.

⁶⁰ LTC Dennis Smith, Acquisition PMO, ARPERCEN, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁶¹ "Army Reserve - A Federal Force," *United States Army Reserve Homepage*, <http://www.army.mil/usar/fedforce.pdf>; Internet; accessed 26 April 1998.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ LTC Bob Hammons, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 27 March 1998, telephone.

⁶⁴ MG William A. Navas, Jr., to LTG Jay M. Garner, 17 December 1996, memorandum, subject: Army Missions the Army National Guard Can Assume, National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., 9-10.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ For more information see Innolog study final report - <http://www.innolog.com/natguard.html>.

⁶⁷ LTC Dave Perkins, Office of ACMO, interview by author, 15 April 1998, telephone.

⁶⁸ "1997 NGAUS Legislative Fact Sheet - National Guard Distributive Training Technology (DTT) Program," *National Guard Association of the United States Homepage*, <http://www.ngaus.org/dtt.html>; Internet; accessed 26 April 1998.

⁶⁹ Combined Support Maintenance Shops (CSMS) and Mobilization and Training Equipment Sites (MATES) with Support.

⁷⁰ Calibre Systems, Inc., "Integrated Sustainment Maintenance: A Logistics Success Story," *Briefing Slides*, 1.

⁷¹ MG William A. Navas, Jr., to LTG Jay M. Garner, 17 December 1996, memorandum, subject: Army Missions the Army National Guard Can Assume, National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C., 22.

⁷² LTC Mike Beam, 4 February 1998, information paper, subject: Maintenance Special Projects, Adjutant General's Department, Texas Army National Guard, Austin, TX, 1-2.

⁷³ LTC Mike Beam, TXARNG Surface Maintenance Office, interview by author, 29 April 1998, telephone.

⁷⁴ William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, (Washington, D.C., May 1997), iii-x.

⁷⁵ National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* (Arlington, VA: <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/>, December, 1997), v-vii.

⁷⁶ William S. Cohen, *Defense Reform Initiative Report*, (Washington, D.C.: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dodreform/index.html>, November, 1997), iii.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Jon R. Katzenbach and Douglas K. Smith, *The Wisdom of Teams* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994), 12.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 60.

⁸⁰ Howard Williams, Moorhead Wright, and Tony Evans, eds., *A Reader in International Relations and Political Theory*, Leviathan, ed. J. Plamentaz (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 92.

⁸¹ Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge* (New York: Harper Collins Publishing, 1997), 17.

⁸² Ibid., 101.

⁸³ Stephen R. Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 274.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAC	Army Acquisition Corps
AAW	Army Acquisition Workforce
AC	Active Component
ACMA	Acquisition Career Management Advocate
ACMO	Acquisition Career Management Office
ADSW	Active Duty - Special Work
AFAR	Army Federal Acquisition Regulation
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AMC	Army Materiel Command
ANG	Air National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARPERCEN	Army Reserve Personnel Center
ASARDA	Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition
AT	Annual Training
CAPL	Critical Acquisition Position List
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CNGB	Chief, National Guard Bureau
COE	Center of Excellence
DA	Department of the Army
DACM	Director, Acquisition Career Management
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DARNG	Director, Army National Guard
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DAWIA	Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act

DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instructions
DRI	Defense Reform Initiative
DTTP	Distributive Training Technology Program
FA	Functional Area
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FORSCOM	United States Forces Command
FTS	Full Time Support
FTUS	Full Time Unit Support
GOSC	General Officer Steering Committee
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IPT	Integrated Process Team
IRON	Inspect and Repair Only as Necessary
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
ISM	Integrated Sustainment Maintenance
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
MACOM	Major Command
MAPL	Military Acquisition Position List
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NDP	National Defense Panel
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGB-ARP	Personnel Directorate, National Guard Bureau
NGB-ARZ-S	Assistant Deputy Director of the National Guard for Support

OCAR	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
PARC	Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting
PAT	Process Action Team
P&C	Purchasing and Contracting
PM	Program/Product Manager
PMO	Program Management Office <u>or</u> Personnel Management Officer
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAPL	Reserve Acquisition Position List
RC	Reserve Component
RC AAW	Reserve Component Army Acquisition Workforce
RCAS	Reserve Component Automation System
RD&A	Research, Development and Acquisition
RSC	Regional Support Command
STARC	State Area Command
TAG	The Adjutant General
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TDY	Temporary Duty
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPU	Troop Program Unit
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USPFO	United States Property and Fiscal Officer